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The Impact of Terrorist Attacks in G7 Countries on International Stock Markets 
and the Role of Investor Sentiment 
 
Abstract 
We consider terrorism acts in G7 countries over the period 1998 - 2017 and examine their impact 
on a sample of stock market indices from 66 countries. Using an event-study methodology we find 
that stock markets decline significantly on the event day and on the following trading day. We 
further consider the investor sentiment following the attacks, based on the content of country-level 
news stories and social media sources, and find that indices in countries associated with higher 
declines in the post-event sentiment, exhibit significantly higher economic losses. Our data and 
results are robust to several settings; these include using samples of events from different studies, 
excluding the 9/11 terrorist attack from the sample of events, excluding stock market indices of 
G7 countries from the sample of equity data and utilizing more sophisticated event-study 
methodologies. 
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1.  Introduction 
   Terrorism incidents are unexpected events that cause fear, shock and bad mood among investors. 
Such feelings can initiate a panic-selling response and may result in sharp stock market declines 
(Burch et al., 2016). Since stock prices incorporate investors’ expectations, but may also react to 
sudden unanticipated shocks, the question of whether terrorism incidents affect stock prices and, 
if so, to what extent, has attracted increasing interest among scholars. While the negative effect of 
terrorism incidents on stock markets around the world has been widely reported (Chen and Siems, 
2004; Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Karolyi and Martell, 2006; Arin et al., 2008; Brounen and Derwall, 
2010; Chesney et al., 2011), there is considerably less knowledge on the relation between changes 
in investor sentiment following terrorism incidents and stock market returns.  
   In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive analysis of the impact of terrorist attacks on 
international stock markets, while accounting for changes in the country-level investor sentiment 
in the days following the attacks. To this end, we consider a contemporary sample of major 
terrorism events in G7 countries over the period 1998-2017 and examine their impact on an 
international sample of stock market indices from 66 countries. We employ an event-study 
methodology and find that, following the attacks, stock markets sustain significant economic 
losses on the event day and on the trading day following the attacks, but continue to decline, albeit 
at a slower rate, until trading day 10 post-event.   
   The main contribution of our study is the consideration of the per-country change in investor 
sentiment in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Specifically, we contend that the extent of stock 
markets’ reaction would depend on how investors value terrorism-related information or, 
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equivalently, how investor sentiment changes after the attacks.1 Indeed, the voluminous and 
widespread dissemination of information following major terrorist attacks creates a channel that 
transmits negative feelings and drives the mood and emotions through continuous exposure of 
disturbing images, videos and exaggerated descriptions (see, for instance, Slone [2000] and 
Chermak and Gruenewald [2007]). In certain cases, particularly when dealing with disasters such 
as terrorism events, the way information is communicated is more likely to provoke fear than to 
inform the public (Anzur, 2000). Slone (2000), in particular, finds a significant increase in the 
anxiety level of people who have been exposed to actions of terrorism in Israel. Schlenger et al. 
(2002) find that the 9/11 terrorist attacks, were associated with increased post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Based on the findings of these studies, one can argue that stock markets in countries with 
negative change in the post-event sentiment realise larger economic losses. Failure to consider 
post-event changes in the country-level sentiment may result in an underestimation of the effect 
on the stock markets of countries with bad investor mood and, respectively, an overestimation of 
the effect in countries where the sentiment is not affected.  
   To this end, we employ a unique dataset that gauges the country-level investor sentiment based 
on news sources. Using our sentiment dataset, we develop a “Surprise” measure to account for the 
changes in the sentiment following the terrorist attacks. Consistent with our expectations, we find 
that stock markets in countries with higher declines in the post-event investor sentiment (i.e. 
countries experiencing a Negative Surprise) sustain significantly larger economic losses relative 
to the remaining countries. Further, based on graphic representation of our results, we find that 
                                                 
1 This argument is supported by studies finding that sentiment and generally mood are associated with investment 
behavior and stock returns (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Brown and Cliff, 2005; Schmeling, 
2009; Frijns et al., 2017).  
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stock markets of countries with Positive (non-Negative) Surprise return to the pre-attack levels in 
a shorter period of time relative to the stock markets of negatively surprised countries which do 
not seem to recover, even 40 trading days after the attacks. 
   Our paper updates and extends the existing literature about the effects of terrorism in the 
following ways. First, it considers a contemporary sample of major terrorism events and examines 
their impact on a comprehensive sample of stock market indices from 66 countries, which helps 
us determine the degree of contagion around the globe. In contrast, prior studies have primarily 
focused on analyzing the contagion effects that single events, like 9/11, have generated on other 
countries (Carter and Simkins, 2004; Chen and Siems, 2004; Nikkinen at al., 2008) or the impact 
of several events on a few countries (Brounen and Derwall, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011). In a broad 
sense, our results show that vulnerabilities or shocks which occur in strong economies are 
propagated to the rest of the world and, in particular, highlight the impact of G7 countries on the 
global economy.2 
   Second, we exploit unique per-country daily sentiment data, based on the content of news articles 
and social media stories. Due to the widespread dissemination of terrorism-related information, 
sentiment data, based on news sources and social media, are a more representative proxy for 
investor sentiment. Such data provide a unique framework for measuring stock market reaction 
more accurately by using each country’s own sentiment. We believe that the investor sentiment 
we use is an important component which we suggest future studies should also employ to examine 
the effect of various shocks in the stock markets or generally in the economy. To the best of our 
                                                 
2 In contrast, the consensus is to examine how shocks only from the US are transmitted to other countries (see, for 
instance, Samarakoon, [2011], Jones and Olson [2015] and Papakyriakou et al. [2018]). 
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knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that investigates the link between investor 
sentiment following events of terrorism and the reaction of stock markets globally. 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review related research and 
develop the hypotheses, in section 3, we describe the data and in section 4, we detail the 
methodology. In section 5, we present the results of the main analysis, in section 6 we discuss 
results from several additional tests.  Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Related research and hypothesis development   
2.1. Do terrorist attacks affect global stock market indices? 
   In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Dow Jones Index sustained 
losses that exceeded 7% upon the reopening of US stock markets six days later (Brounen and 
Derwall, 2010).  The effect of the attack was far more pronounced in the airline industry (Carter 
and Simkins, 2004; Chesney et al., 2011). Similarly, the MSCI World Index dropped by more than 
4.5% in the first days after the 9/11 event, whereas after the Madrid attacks on 11 March 2004, it 
dropped by 1.72% (Drakos, 2010). There is a plethora of evidence suggesting a negative effect in 
global stock markets following terrorist attacks (see also Nikkinen et al., 2008; Chesney et al., 
2011). Furthermore, prior studies find that the markets recover within the first week of the 
aftermath (Brounen and Derwall, 2010) with others finding that such recovery could take up to a 
month (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006). Finally, some studies find that markets do not return to 
their previously traded levels in the foreseeable horizon (Eldor and Melnick, 2004).  
   In this paper, we update the existing literature by examining the impact of major terrorist attacks 
in G7 countries, over the period 1998-2017, on a comprehensive sample of stock market indices 
from 66 countries. The consideration of terrorist attacks in G7 countries is important in our analysis 
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because we expect the shocks that these attacks inflict on the strongest economies of the world to 
stimulate high uncertainty, lead to questions on global safety, and increase the fear and uncertainty 
among investors globally. Subsequently, stock markets are expected to decline, thus informing our 
first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Terrorist attacks in G7 countries will generate strong negative abnormal returns on 
international stock markets.   
  
2.2. Do countries with negative changes in the investor sentiment after terrorist attacks, 
experience larger declines in their stock markets?  
   Catastrophic events generate anxiety among investors which in turn can affect their investment 
behavior – for example, their risk preferences and, consequently, asset prices. In the aftermath of 
aviation disasters, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) find a significant negative effect in the US stock 
markets and suggest that increased anxiety is to blame. There is, however, inconclusive evidence 
as to whether investors shift towards safer assets, such as US treasury bills or the US dollar. In the 
case of terrorism incidents though, Wang and Young (2017) find that investors do shift their risky 
investments towards safer securities, such as government bonds. Furthermore, Nikkinen and 
Vahamaa (2010) find a negative shift of the probability density functions implied by option prices, 
which in fact reflect the negative outlook anticipated by market participants, after three major 
terrorist attacks (9/11, Madrid 2004 attacks and London 2005 attacks). Analyzing closed-end fund 
discounts, Burch et al. (2003) document that such discounts significantly increased after the 9/11 
attacks, concluding that they carry the sentiment of small investors. Using questionnaires to gauge 
investors’ expectations, Glaser and Weber (2005) document that German investors’ expectations 
for future returns after the 9/11 attacks were higher. Because the questionnaire was disseminated 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346438 
8 
 
in the weeks following the 9/11 events, the finding is attributed to the fact that investors expected 
a mean reversion. Finally, Drakos (2010) shows that the psychosocial impacts caused by the 
attacks amplify the negative effects of terrorism.3  
   Given that terrorist attacks generate bad mood and increased uncertainty, we seek to examine 
how changes in the investor sentiment affect international stock markets following acts of 
terrorism. The rapid and extensive spread of information following terrorist attacks, as well as the 
tone of the media reporting of the events, has a negative impact on investor mood and sentiment 
and, by implication, stock prices. Given that the sentiment data we use are based on a large number 
of news and social media sources, the fact they are available at country-level, and on a daily basis, 
affords us a unique framework to measure the post-event change in investor sentiment and examine 
the impact on international stock markets, conditional on the change of each country’s own 
sentiment. The second hypothesis follows.    
Hypothesis 2: The negative abnormal returns generated by terrorist attacks in G7 countries will 
be more pronounced in stock markets of countries with negative change in the investor sentiment 
in the post-event period. 
 
3. Data 
   In this paper we employ three sources of data: a) terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism 
Database, b) local stock market indices from Thomson DataStream, and c) Marketpsych indices, 
provided by Thomson Reuters.   
                                                 
3 We dedicate a separate section for this finding in Section 6.3.2. 
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3.1. Terrorist attacks in major economies 
   We collect our sample of terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which 
maintains a large record of in excess of 180,000 terrorism incidents anywhere in the world, since 
1970.4 We choose major events in territories controlled by G7 countries over the period 1998-
2017, because such events are likely to cause fear and may affect investors’ decisions. Further, 
terrorist attacks on such strong economies can lead to questions on global safety and increase 
uncertainty among investors.  We filter out duplicate events (for instance 9/11 is reported four 
times because the terrorist groups hit at four different locations on the same day) and events that 
are characterized as ambiguous (i.e. cannot be said with certainty they were acts of terrorism). 
Imposing these filters yields a sample of 28 terrorist attacks in six target countries (all G7 countries, 
except for Italy) that we present in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2. Local stock market indices 
   We source equity data from Thomson DataStream. In total, we take 67 equity return indices from 
the “DS Market” family of indices.5 From these, 66 indices are local (country-level) while the last 
one is the world index. The world index is the market value-weighted average of all the local-level 
indices. Most “DS Market” indices start on 1 January 1973 with only a few exceptions which 
become available in later years. However, since our sample of terrorist attacks is confined within 
the years from 1998 to 2017, we only use equity data from 1997 onwards.6 Further, we report all 
                                                 
4 For more details visit, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
5 “DS Market” is used to denote DataStream’s proprietary set of equity indices.  
6 That is because, for the event-study methodology, the estimation data need to extend back some time before the date 
of the first event in the sample. 
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indices in US dollars to eliminate noise that may come from foreign exchange rates, a common 
practice in empirical studies of international financial markets (Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009). 
Table 2 provides a comprehensive list of the country-level equity indices we employ.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.3. Thomson Reuters Marketpsych Indices and surprise 
   In our study, we use the Thomson Reuters Marketpsych Indices (TRMI) to account for the 
country-level investor sentiment. TRMI are available since 1 January 1998 but, depending on the 
country in question, they may start later. TRMI summarize the content as well as the quantity of 
economic, political and other country-level news into meaningful daily indices which gauge the 
overall sentiment and generally other market feelings such as optimism, joy, trust, and fear. These 
indices are generated by an algorithm developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with 
Marketpsych LLC which identifies news stories from Thomson Reuters News Feed Direct, Factiva 
News and other third-party news sources, on a real-time basis, and over a 24-hour rolling window.7 
   There are several advantages of using the TRMI. First, the TRMI are available for a large number 
of countries as opposed to more traditional sentiment measures (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Yu and 
Yuan, 2011; Huang et al., 2015), essentially allowing us to measure the post-event change in 
investor sentiment for all the countries we have equity data for. This is particularly important in 
the light of countries such as Syria and Afghanistan which are known warzones, or even the case 
of Mexico where the drug war claims the lives of tens of thousands of people every year. Such 
countries are less likely to react to terrorism (or similar human-loss related) news to the same 
                                                 
7 Countries without TRMI data are Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia. For further information on the TRMI indices, 
visit https://www.marketpsych.com 
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extent as more peaceful territories. We further posit that our sentiment data are more relevant 
compared to more traditional (event-specific) terrorism intensity measures because they can be 
used to filter out those countries that are more resilient to terrorism-related news.  Second, the 
TRMI are based on a very large number of news sources, suggesting that the indices are 
comprehensive, efficient and reliable (Huang et al., 2018). Third, the TRMI are flexible as they 
are available for different sources of news: traditional news, social media and combined.8 
   Among the TRMI family, we use the overall per-country Sentiment index for inference. The 
Sentiment is generated by an algorithm that classifies and then ranks news stories on a continuous 
scale between -1 and +1 (i.e. negative to positive), depending on the tone and the choice of words 
in the news stories. Using this index, we construct a Surprise measure based on the changes in the 
sentiment following terrorist attacks. The procedure consists of the following steps. First we 
estimate the abnormal sentiment by subtracting the average sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 
inclusive, from the raw sentiment of days 0 and +1. Then we add the abnormal sentiments on days 
0 and +1 to get the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS). Finally, for countries with negative 
CAS, we assume a Negative Surprise while, for the rest of the countries, we assume a Positive 
(non-Negative) Surprise.  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Event-study 
   As a first step, we implement a short-horizon event-study analysis, an approach regarded as 
straightforward and trouble-free (Kothari and Warner, 2007). To ensure the robustness of our 
results, we adapt the steps in Michaelides et al. (2015) to the standards of our study. We estimate 
                                                 
8 Our results are based on the combined dataset. Results for the other two datasets can be provided upon request. 
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the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using country stock market returns as the dependent 
variable and the world market returns as the independent variable. We choose the estimation period 
to cover the interval of (-100, -11) trading days, relative to event day 0.9 10 Specifically, we estimate 
the following equation.  
𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 = 𝒂𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝒊𝒋𝑹𝑾𝒕𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋  
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28. 
(1) 
   Ritj is the stock market return of country “i”, on day “t”, relative to the event “j”. RWtj is the return 
of the world index on day “t”, relative to event “j”. 
   Once estimated, we use the coefficients from Equation (1) to calculate abnormal returns (AR) in 
the event window (-10, +10). We define abnormal returns (AR) as the difference of actual (raw) 
and expected returns: 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 = 𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 − ?̂?𝒊𝒋 − ?̂?𝒊𝒋𝑹𝑾𝒕𝒋 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28. 
(2) 
We obtain the cumulative abnormal return over the interval (t1, t2), as follows. 
       𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋[𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐] = 𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕𝟏,𝒋 + ⋯ +𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕𝟐,𝒋 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28 
−10 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ +10. 
(3) 
   Then we estimate the equally weighted average (across all event-country observations) 
cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) over the same interval, as follows.  
𝑨𝑪𝑨𝑹[𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐] =
𝟏
𝒏 ∗ 𝒎
∑ ∑ 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐) 
𝒎
𝒋=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
−10 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ +10 
𝑛 =  66, 𝑚 =  28. 
(4) 
    
                                                 
9 We follow Brounen and Derwall (2010) in choosing the estimation and event windows. 
10 Event day 0 is the actual date of the terrorism incident, if a working day, or the first working day following the 
actual day of the incident, if not a working day. 
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   The next step involves the standardization of abnormal returns in the event window to account 
for event-induced variance. This method, first proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), takes AR in the 
event window (Equation (2)) and divides them by the time series standard deviation of the residuals 
(abnormal returns) from the estimation period (-100, -11). The steps we follow to estimate the 
standardized abnormal returns (SAR hereafter) are described in Equations (5)-(7).    
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝟏
𝟗𝟎
∑ 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕
−𝟏𝟏
𝒕=−𝟏𝟎𝟎
 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28 
(5) 
𝒔𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅ = √
𝟏
𝟖𝟗
∑ (𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕 − 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )𝟐
−𝟏𝟏
𝒕=−𝟏𝟎𝟎
 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28 
(6) 
𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 =
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝒔𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅
 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 26 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28 
(7) 
 
   Finally, the test statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) is given by Equation (8). 
𝑻𝑩𝑴𝑷 = √𝒏 ∗ 𝒎
𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝒔𝒕
 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑛 =  66, 𝑚 =  28. 
(8) 
   The formula used to estimate Average Standardized Abnormal Returns (ASAR), the numerator 
of TBMP, is provided below.  
𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕 =
𝟏
𝒏 ∗ 𝒎
∑ ∑ 𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝒎
𝒋=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑛 =  66, 𝑚 =  28. 
(9) 
The denominator of TBMP is estimated as follows. 
𝒔𝒕 = √
𝟏
𝒏 ∗ 𝒎
∑ ∑(𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝒎
𝒋=𝟏
− 𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕)𝟐
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
−10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10 
𝑛 =  66, 𝑚 =  28. 
(10) 
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   Finally, we estimate the test-statistic of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), which is an extension of 
the Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic.11 The difference is that the KP statistic also takes into 
consideration the average sample cross-correlation of the estimation period of residuals (?̅?). KP 
shows that, if the ?̅? is not accounted for, then the resulting test-statistic would tend to over-reject 
the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns. The KP test-statistic is estimated in Equation (11). 
𝑻𝑲𝑷 = 𝑻𝑩𝑴𝑷√
𝟏 − ?̅?
𝟏 + (𝒏 ∗ 𝒎 − 𝟏)?̅?
 𝑛 =  66, 𝑚 =  28. (11) 
   It is useful to note that we estimate test-statistics (Equations (8) and (11)) assuming that abnormal 
returns (Equation (2)) are independent and identically distributed random variables following the 
Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.  As such, the test statistics are assumed to 
asymptotically approach the standard Gaussian distribution, provided that the number of event-
country observations on day t (relative to the event) is sufficiently large.12 
4.2. Regression analysis 
   For the regression analysis, we develop a multivariate OLS regression model, given in Equation 
(12), to identify whether the investor sentiment, upon which our measure of Surprise is based, is 
related with stock market returns.  
 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 = 𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕𝒋 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒊𝒕𝒋 + 𝜼𝒊 + 𝝀𝒋 + 𝜺 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 66 
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 28 
0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10. 
(12) 
                                                 
11 In the tables of results we only report the test statistics of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). The test statistics of Boehmer 
et al. (1991) are not tabulated but can be provided upon request.  
12 Note that while for Equations (8) and (11) the number of event-country observations is assumed to be 1848 (i.e. 28 
events x 66 stock market indices) the actual number is smaller (i.e. equal to 1799) due to the fact that, for some of the 
earlier events, some countries do not have equity data. This difference is acknowledged and accounted for in the 
calculations which generate the results. 
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   The Abnormal Return (AR) is the dependent variable, defined in Equation (2). The subscript “𝑖” 
enumerates the countries (stock markets) in the sample of equity data while subscript “𝑗” 
enumerates the terrorist attacks. In this instance, we consider the response of stock markets 
following the attacks only; hence, “𝑡” ranges from 0 to 10. The element “𝛽0” represents the 
intercept while the element “𝛽1” is the coefficient of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS), the main 
explanatory variable. The Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on trading day “t” is estimated by subtracting 
from the raw sentiment of that day, the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 inclusive.  
Further, the component “𝛽2” is the coefficient of the forecasted, via a GARCH (1,1) process, daily 
volatility (Vol) of stock market returns whereas “𝛽3” is the coefficient of a stock market liquidity 
(Liq) proxy, estimated as the ratio of daily turnover by value over total market value. It should be 
noted that Equation (12) is estimated in a stepwise fashion. For the first estimation only the main 
explanatory variable (AS) is included, while progressively more variables are added (Vol and Liq) 
in the second and third estimations, respectively. We address omitted variable bias concerns by 
employing indicator variables at the country and event levels (parameters “𝜂𝑖” and “𝜆𝑗”, 
respectively). The parameter ε represents the error terms, assumed to be heteroskedastic (White-
Huber standard errors are used to control for that).  
5. Main analysis 
   In this section we discuss the results of our main analysis, generated by applying the event-study 
methodology (Section 4.1) to our data. In summary, we consider several windows of cumulative 
abnormal stock market returns timed before, after and around our sample of terrorist attacks.  
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5.1. Graphical representation of findings 
   Before discussing the results generated by our event-study analysis, it is useful perhaps to first 
construct a graphical representation of how stock markets react to terrorism. Figure 1 contains 
plots for a) the full sample of observations (overall case), b) the subsample of markets with 
Negative Surprise, and c) the subsample of markets with Positive Surprise in the time window [-
10, +10], around the event. 13  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
   The graph of the overall case shows that stock market indices experience a sharp decline 
following terrorism acts, with most of the losses materializing on event day and the next trading 
day. After that, stock markets stabilize, but continue following a (more gradual) downward route 
until trading day +10. The sample of indices with Negative Surprise exhibit more interesting 
results, as these markets react more strongly, compared to the overall case. Finally, the sample of 
indices with Positive Surprise also decline but the response is seemingly milder relative to the 
Overall and Negative Surprise cases.  
5.2. Event-study: Overall case 
   For the event-study results in the overall case, we consider the response of the 66 international 
stock market indices (in Table 2) to 28 terrorist attacks (in Table 1) and present results in Table 3. 
Several time windows of Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) are statistically and 
economically significant. These are the [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3], [0,+5], [0,+10], [+1,+2], [+1, +3], 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that while all the 28 terrorist attacks in our sample are used to generate results, not all countries 
have Sentiment data, needed for the Surprise cases. Hence the number of event-country observations for the overall 
case is slightly higher compared to the two Surprise case (refer to Tables 1 and 2 for further details).   
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[+1, +5] and [+1, +10], with cumulative abnormal returns estimated at -0.414%, -0.442%, -
0.491%, -0.536%, -0.538%, -0.254%, -0.304%, -0.348% and -0.35%, respectively. The results 
suggest that, on average, the response of international stock markets to terrorism acts in G7 
countries is immediate but also short-lived as none of the windows starting on trading day +2 or 
later is significant. In total, the results support our first hypothesis; that after terrorist attacks in G7 
countries, international stock market indices experience sharp declines. Note that in the period that 
precedes the event, all time windows are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the change 
documented post-event is terrorism-related. 
5.3. Event-study: Investor sentiment  
   Table 3 (middle column) presents ACAR for the case of stock markets in countries with a 
Negative Surprise post-event. The time windows [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3], [0,+5], [0,+10], [+1,+2], 
[+1, +3], [+1, +5] and [+1, +10] exhibit significant and negative stock market reaction, with ACAR 
estimated at -0.508%, -0.553%, -0.613%, -0.592%, -0.642%, -0.287%, -0.347%, -0.326% and -
0.376%, respectively. Besides significant, the losses are also persistent as they continue to 
accumulate without signs of reversal for at least 10 trading days post-event. However, after relative 
day +1, the decline is less pronounced and bears little economic and statistical significance, 
indicating that markets stabilize shortly after the occurrence of terrorism, even in cases of Negative 
Surprise. Overall, the results are consistent with the second hypothesis; that is, markets with 
negative change in the investor sentiment following terrorist attacks in G7 countries are associated 
with significantly stronger economic losses. Finally, in the 10-day window that precedes the event, 
we do not document statistically significant ACAR in any of the cases we examine, indicating that 
our methodology is robust and that our measure for Surprise efficiently captures (and isolates) the 
negative effect of terrorism on stock market returns.   
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
6. Additional analysis 
   In order to test the accuracy of our main analysis results we run several additional tests which 
we classify in four categories. In the first category of tests, we assess the quality of our sample of 
terrorism events. In the second category, we test the robustness of our Surprise measure, and in 
the third category we compare the results of our baseline event-study methodology with several 
alternatives developed in past literature. Finally, this paper benefits from regression analysis, as a 
means of supporting the assumption that investor sentiment and stock market returns are related.  
6.1. Testing the sample of events 
6.1.1. Removing equity data from G7 countries 
   Because we consider terrorist attacks in G7 countries, one could argue that the results are driven 
by the response of stock markets in G7 countries, as these countries were the targets. To address 
these concerns, we exclude the stock indices from the seven G7 countries from the sample of 
equity data and repeat the analysis. Our results suggest that the response in non-G7 countries 
(Table 4, Overall ex G7) is slightly stronger than the Overall case (Table 4, Overall). This finding 
is very interesting and supports the argument that terrorist attacks have a strong contagion effect 
on non-target countries.  
6.1.2. Removing the 9/11 terrorist attack 
   In order to address concerns that the major terrorism event of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States may be driving the results, we remove it from the sample of events and repeat the analysis, 
reporting results in Table 4 (Overall ex 9/11).  The results, albeit slightly less significant, remain 
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in the same direction, retaining their economic and (in most cases) statistical significance. In total, 
our results are robust to removing the 9/11 terrorism event from the initial sample of events. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
6.1.3. Filtering out proximal events  
   Prior literature on event-studies has devised ways of correctly measuring the effect from events 
occurring close to one another timewise. For instance, Michaelides et al. (2015, 2018), who explore 
the effect of sovereign rating downgrades on stock and foreign exchange markets, filter out those 
events that supersede other (same type of) events for a period of 21 trading days (one calendar 
month). In this manner the authors isolate the pure effect of events because, as they argue, follow-
up events are not as impactful as the ones preceding them. We adapt this procedure and filter out 
of our sample of terrorist attacks those attacks that follow other attacks within 4.5 calendar months’ 
time (roughly, our event-study’s estimation period). Following this filtering, our initial sample of 
28 events is reduced to 11.14 Notice that we also remove the 9/11 terrorist attack because of its 
large scale.15 The results follow below.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
   The results in Table 5 are stronger in economic significance terms than those in Table 3 (i.e. the 
ACAR are more negative). We postulate that there are at least two reasons for this. First, 
considering events that occur shortly after other events can potentially decrease the significance 
of the results in the post-event window. That is because some event-study methodologies (ours 
                                                 
14 The remaining events are numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 22 in Table 1. 
15 Since the remaining sample of events is relatively small, including the very influential 9/11 attack would hugely 
increase the significance of our results. Hence, we remove it to avoid this situation. 
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included) base the test statistics on the standard deviation of the residuals in the estimation period. 
When other events occur in the estimation period, the volatility in stock returns can increase, 
subsequently reducing the value (and the significance) of the reported t-stats. Second, the sample 
that we use to generate results in this section excludes the most recent events which, we argue, 
carry little economic significance relative to older events. This is because terrorist attacks have 
become far more frequent and violent in recent times and, due to this increased intensity, investors 
have become more resilient to this kind of news and do not react as strongly as before. This view 
is also in line with findings in prior literature (see, for example, the discussion in Markoulis and 
Katsikidis [2018]). 
6.1.4. Samples of events from other studies 
   As an additional test, we adopt two alternative samples from two different studies on terrorism 
(Brounen and Derwall, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011), and repeat the event-study analysis for each 
of the two samples separately.  
   The sample from Brounen and Derwall (2010) consists of 31 terrorist attacks over the period 
1991-2005 which directly relate to, but have not necessarily happened in, countries with major 
economies. Applying our baseline event-study methodology to the sample of Brounen and Derwall 
generates results that are similar to or stronger than ours, demonstrating high statistical and 
economic significance. The results from Brounen and Derwall’s (2010) sample are provided in 
Table 6 (equivalent to Table 3).    
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
   The sample from Chesney et al. (2011) consists of 77 terrorist attacks between 1994 and 2005, 
in both developed and developing countries. Applying our baseline event-study methodology to 
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Chesney et al.’s (2011) sample yields results similar to our own, although, under certain 
circumstances, the former are slightly less significant. Chesney et al.’s (2011) results are provided 
in Table 7 (equivalent to Table 3).16  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
   Finally, we argue that since the two alternative samples of events we choose to test generate 
similar results to ours, then our sample of terrorism events is comprehensive, well-selected, and 
robust. 
6.2. Testing the event-study methodology 
6.2.1. Considering additional global factors 
   As an additional test to our event study methodology, we use the global version of Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model to estimate expected returns (rather than using the conventional CAPM), 
keeping everything else unchanged. The results are reported in Table 8 and are similar to those in 
Table 3, albeit slightly less significant. Overall our main results are robust to this test. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6.2.2. Accounting for Beta instability 
   Our estimates of CAPM-betas could be subject to variation over time, thus adding uncertainty 
to our results. To address this concern, we re-run our event study by setting the coefficient for the 
market risk factor equal to unity and report the results in Table 9. The results are amplified so they 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that, in Table 7, there are three cases of time windows (prior the event) in which the corresponding 
ACAR appears to be statistically significant. We attribute the significance to a type I error. 
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become economically more significant but, qualitatively, the inference is unchanged. Overall, our 
main results remain robust in this test.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
6.2.3. Switching regimes 
   In this part, we discuss an extension of the “first mover” filtering in Michaelides et al. (2015, 
2018), also discussed in Section 6.1.3, which is a method of removing disturbances of the same 
type of event from the estimation window of an event-study. The counter-argument here is that 
while the “first mover” may work well for events of the same type, it does not necessarily hold 
true for all types of events. In other words, there may be other “irrelevant” events in the estimation 
window which can potentially generate shocks, increasing the standard deviation of the residuals. 
To address this concern we consider a two-state market model that accounts for high and low 
volatility regimes, during the estimation period, similar to Aktas et al. (2007).17 The test-statistic 
in Aktas et al. (2007) is the same as the test-statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991), also given in 
Equation (8), with the only difference being that the standard errors are estimated from the standard 
deviation of the low variance regime. Other differences include the extended estimation window 
(-250, -25), to match the one in Aktas et al. (2007), and also the added flexibility of changing 
estimated regression coefficients between the two regimes.18 Results are reported in Table 10.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
                                                 
17 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for making this recommendation. 
18 We are indebted to Nihat Aktas for giving us detailed guidance for implementing the methodology in his paper.   
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   Compared to Table 3, the results generated by this methodology are similar. There are some 
differences, with the most notable one being the smaller gap between the ACAR of the Negative 
and Positive Surprise cases. Even then, the Negative Surprise case maintains a small edge in the 
first days following the events. In all, the results from applying Aktas et al. (2007) methodology 
to our data support both our hypotheses. 
6.2.4. Placebo test (random date events) 
   In order to further test the robustness of our methodology, we perform a placebo test, where we 
pick 28 random dates over the period 1998-2017 (to match the size and time span of our own 
sample of events) and generate the equivalent of Table 3 (overall case only). The test generates 
ACAR that are indistinguishable from zero, a) suggesting the correct implementation of our event-
study methodology, and b) that the adverse reaction of international stock markets in the post-
event period is a true effect of terrorism acts and is not generated by other unrelated incidents or 
news.19 
6.3. Testing the Surprise measure 
6.3.1. An alternative measure for Surprise 
   In this section, we test the robustness of our Surprise measure (introduced in Section 3.3) by 
constructing an alternative measure that we base on the post-event Cumulative Difference in 
Sentiment (CDS). For the calculation procedure, first we estimate the difference in sentiments 
(DS) on days 0 and +1, defined as DSt = Sentimentt – Sentimentt-1. Then, we sum the DS of days 0 
and +1 to get the CDS. If the CDS of a country is negative, we assume a Negative Surprise. 
Alternatively, if CDS is non-negative, we assume a Positive (non-Negative) Surprise. Table 11 
                                                 
19 Results from the placebo test remain untabulated but can be provided by the authors upon request. 
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contains the results, when repeating the event-study analysis using the alternative measure for 
Surprise. Because the results are qualitatively identical to those of Table 3, we contend that our 
main measure for Surprise is robust to this test.  
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
6.3.2. Accounting for human loss 
   One can argue that our sentiment measures are reflective of the severity of the terrorist attacks 
(i.e. the number of fatalities could be responsible for sentiment changes). With respect to that, prior 
literature (Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Eldor et al., 2012) finds that the effect of terrorist attacks on 
stock market returns increases as the number of casualties and fatalities increases. Furthermore, 
Drakos (2010) explores the association of terrorist attacks with stock market returns, based on the 
psychosocial impact that the attacks cause. The author reports that the Global Terrorism Database, 
which we also use, ranks terrorist attacks based on their level of psychosocial impact as major, 
moderate, minor and null. Upon closer inspection of the database’s website, we find this 
information is no longer available. However, one possibility is that the database based the 
psychosocial filter on the loss-of-human-life numbers.  
   To control for the aforementioned issue, we regress our measure of Cumulative Abnormal 
Sentiment (discussed in Section 3.3) on the natural logarithm of fatalities, also accounting for 
country and event heterogeneity. Next, we calculate the residual of Cumulative Abnormal 
Sentiment (CAS) by subtracting the fitted (estimated) CAS from the actual one. Finally, we 
estimate Surprise (discussed in Section 3.3) using the residual CAS, instead of the actual CAS, 
and report results in Table 9. Overall the results in Table 9 are comparable to those of Table 3, 
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although the differences between the negative and positive cases are less pronounced.  Still, these 
results suggest that our measure of Surprise is robust to the element of human loss. 
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
6.4. OLS regression 
   The regression analysis is performed as a means of showing that investor sentiment can indeed 
affect stock market returns in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, even when controlling for event 
and country specific time-invariant factors as well as stock market daily volatility and liquidity. In 
particular, we measure the explanatory power of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on the Abnormal 
Return (AR) by estimating Equation (12) using the pooled sample of event-country observations, 
reporting results in Table 13.20  
[INSERT TABLE 13 HERE] 
   The results in Table 13 suggest that the AS is positively related to the AR, meaning that positive 
(negative) changes in the Sentiment post-event are associated with more positive (negative) stock 
market reactions. These results strengthen our event-study findings because they support our 
argument that, following terrorist attacks, the effect of the sentiment on stock market performance 
is significant.  
                                                 
20 Table 13 reports two results from two regression estimations. The second result is derived from regressing the 
Difference in Sentiments (DS), upon which our supplementary measure of Surprise is based, on the Abnormal Return. 
More discussion on DS is available in Section 6.3.1.  
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7. Conclusions 
   This study considers a contemporary sample of 28 major terrorist attacks in G7 countries and 
examines their impact on an international sample of stock market indices from 66 countries.  
   We employ an event-study methodology and find that, following the terrorist attacks, stock 
markets sustain significant economic losses with the effect being more pronounced on the event 
day and the next trading day. After this time period, markets continue to decline more gradually 
and without showing signs of reversal for up to 10 trading days (two calendar weeks) in the 
aftermath of the events. We further classify countries by Surprise, proxied by the content of 
country-level news stories and social media sources, and find that the stock markets of countries 
with Negative Surprise post-event sustain considerably steeper declines, compared to the overall 
case. Our event-study results are robust to several settings; these include using samples of events 
from different studies, excluding the 9/11 terrorist attack from the sample of events, excluding 
stock market indices of G7 countries from the sample of equity data, and employing more 
sophisticated event-study methodologies. 
   This study also benefits from regression analysis. After controlling for time-invariant event and 
country-specific factors, we demonstrate strong evidence of a positive association between the 
investor sentiment and the reaction documented in stock markets. This result is in-line with our 
event-study results, supporting the argument that negatively surprised countries exhibit 
considerably larger economic losses following terrorist attacks.  
   Our study has implications for both governments and investors alike, for which we recommend 
the following remedial actions. First, we propose that countries more vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
enforce stricter security measures as a means for prevention of both human and economic losses 
that follow acts of terrorism. Second, to the extent that it is possible, taking measures to reduce 
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terrorism incidents would not only have beneficial societal effects but also positive spillovers 
regarding economic outcomes as, in our case, on stock market performance. Third, we propose 
that all countries impose measures to regulate the intensity by which terrorism event news (or any 
other types of negative events news) is reported in the media. Since negative news induces strong 
adverse effects on stock markets, this measure can help reduce the magnitude of economic losses 
following acts of terrorism (or other types of disastrous event). From an investor’s point of view, 
it would be wiser to reduce their exposure to countries with negative sentiment. However, 
conversely, it may also be possible to develop trading strategies to generate profits, following 
large-scale terrorist attacks in G7 economies. Since the TRMI indices (upon which our measure 
for Surprise is based) are available on a real-time basis, and over a 24-hour rolling window, our 
findings can have real-life implications and prove to be beneficial to a wide spectrum of investors. 
However, because such an expansion also needs to take into consideration several other parameters 
that may corrode the gains such strategies can generate, for instance transaction costs and foreign 
exchange rates, we leave this question open for future discourse.  
   Future work may consider the period following terrorist attacks over an extended horizon and 
explore the longer-term effects on stock market indices. Some preliminary evidence, illustrated in 
Figure 2, suggests that the overall decline of stock markets ceases at (about) trading day 10 post-
event, stock markets then enter reversal, and all losses are being recovered by (about) trading day 
40. It is also interesting to note that in the case of Negative Surprise the losses seemingly persist 
until trading day 40 post-event without signs of reversal, which calls for more responsive and 
drastic intervention from the authorities to stabilize financial markets in the countries that respond 
in this manner. However, because there are also several other factors that need to be taken into 
consideration in the long run, such as the exponential increase in the volatility of cumulative stock 
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market returns, which may render these visual differences insignificant, in order to yield robust 
inference, we leave this question open for future investigation. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: List of terrorist attacks (1998-2017) 
 
Ref Date of Event Country City Fatalities Injuries 
1 15/08/1998 United Kingdom Omagh 29 220 
2 17/02/1999 Germany Wilmersdorf 3 43 
3 20/04/1999 United States Littleton 15 24 
4 11/09/2001 United States New York City 2996 7366 
5 07/07/2005 United Kingdom London 56 784 
6 27/07/2008 United States Knoxville 2 7 
7 05/11/2009 United States Killeen 13 32 
8 18/02/2010 United States Austin 2 15 
9 05/08/2012 United States Oak Creek 7 4 
10 15/04/2013 United States Boston 3 264 
11 19/04/2013 United States Watertown 2 16 
12 13/04/2014 United States Overland Park 3 0 
13 23/05/2014 United States Isla Vista 7 13 
14 22/10/2014 Canada Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu 2 3 
15 13/11/2015 France Paris 93 217 
16 12/06/2016 United States Orlando 50 53 
17 14/07/2016 France Nice 87 433 
18 17/07/2016 United States Baton Rouge 4 3 
19 18/07/2016 Germany Wurzburg 1 5 
20 22/07/2016 Germany Munich 10 27 
21 26/07/2016 Japan Sagamihara 19 26 
22 19/12/2016 Germany Berlin 12 48 
23 22/05/2017 United Kingdom Manchester 23 119 
24 03/06/2017 United Kingdom London 11 48 
25 19/06/2017 United Kingdom London 1 12 
26 12/08/2017 United States Charlottesville 1 19 
27 24/09/2017 United States Antioch 1 8 
28 01/10/2017 United States Las Vegas 59 851 
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Table 2: List of countries – Stock market indices 
This table lists the 66 countries with equity data in our sample. Thomson Reuters Markepsych 
Indices (TRMI) are available for all listed countries, since the 1st of January 1998, with the 
exception of Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
Ref Country Has TRMI Ref Country Has TRMI 
1 Argentina Yes 34 Malaysia Yes 
2 Australia Yes 35 Malta Yes 
3 Austria Yes 36 Mexico Yes 
4 Bahrain Yes 37 Morocco Yes 
5 Belgium Yes 38 Netherlands Yes 
6 Brazil Yes 39 New Zealand Yes 
7 Bulgaria Yes 40 Nigeria Yes 
8 Canada Yes 41 Norway Yes 
9 Chile Yes 42 Oman Yes 
10 China Yes 43 Pakistan Yes 
11 Colombia Yes 44 Peru Yes 
12 Croatia Yes 45 Philippines Yes 
13 Cyprus Yes 46 Poland Yes 
14 Czech Republic Yes 47 Portugal Yes 
15 Denmark Yes 48 Qatar Yes 
16 Egypt Yes 49 Romania Yes 
17 Estonia Yes 50 Russia Yes 
18 Finland Yes 51 Singapore Yes 
19 France Yes 52 Slovakia No 
20 Germany Yes 53 Slovenia No 
21 Greece Yes 54 South Africa Yes 
22 Hong Kong Yes 55 South Korea Yes 
23 Hungary Yes 56 Spain Yes 
24 India Yes 57 Sri Lanka Yes 
25 Indonesia Yes 58 Sweden Yes 
26 Ireland Yes 59 Switzerland Yes 
27 Israel Yes 60 Taiwan Yes 
28 Italy Yes 61 Thailand Yes 
29 Japan Yes 62 Turkey Yes 
30 Jordan Yes 63 UAE Yes 
31 Kuwait Yes 64 United Kingdom Yes 
32 Lithuania Yes 65 United States Yes 
33 Luxembourg No 66 Venezuela Yes 
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Table 3: Main analysis 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks 
listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use all 28 terrorist attacks and 
equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise, we use all 
the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, 
excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative 
Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day one post-event is negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise 
equals unity when the CAS on day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on 
day one post-event is the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by 
subtracting the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the 
event. T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.011% -0.038% 0.016% 
[-5, -1] 0.043% -0.060% 0.146% 
[-3, -1] 0.086% -0.051% 0.222% 
[-2, -1] 0.033% -0.074% 0.140% 
[0, +1] -0.414%*** -0.508%*** -0.320%*** 
[0, +2] -0.442%*** -0.553%*** -0.329%*** 
[0, +3] -0.491%*** -0.613%*** -0.369%*** 
[0, +5] -0.536%*** -0.592%*** -0.480%** 
[0, +10] -0.538%*** -0.642%*** -0.434%** 
[+1, +2] -0.254%*** -0.287%*** -0.220%** 
[+1, +3] -0.304%*** -0.347%*** -0.260%** 
[+1, +5] -0.348%** -0.326%** -0.370%* 
[+1, +10] -0.350%* -0.376%* -0.324%* 
[+2, +3] -0.011% -0.105% -0.049% 
[+2, +4] 0.039% -0.145% -0.073% 
[+2, +5] 0.047% -0.084% -0.160% 
[+2, +10] 0.071% -0.134% -0.114% 
[+3, +5] -0.022% -0.038% -0.150% 
[+3, +10] 0.003% -0.089% -0.104% 
[+5, +10] 0.033% 0.011% -0.041% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 4: Additional analysis – Testing the sample of events 
This table presents Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks 
listed in Table 1, using equity data from countries in Table 2. ACAR is given in Equation (4). 
In the Overall case, we consider all 28 terrorist attacks and use equity data from all 66 countries. 
In the Overall ex G7 case, we consider all 28 terrorist attacks and use equity data from 59 
countries (all except the USA, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and Italy). In the 
Overall ex 9/11 case we consider 27 terrorist attacks (all except the 9/11 attack) and use equity 
data from all 66 countries. Finally, in the Overall ex 9/11 & G7 case we consider 27 terrorist 
attacks (all except the 9/11 attack) and use equity data from 59 countries (all except the USA, 
the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and Italy). T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari 
and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Overall ex G7 Overall ex 9/11 Overall ex 9/11 & G7 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.011% 0.004% 0.065% 0.080% 
[-5, -1] 0.043% 0.050% 0.101% 0.109% 
[-3, -1] 0.086% 0.086% 0.105% 0.106% 
[-2, -1] 0.033% 0.032% 0.052% 0.052% 
[0, +1] -0.414%*** -0.437%*** -0.356%*** -0.380%*** 
[0, +2] -0.442%*** -0.470%*** -0.380%*** -0.407%*** 
[0, +3] -0.491%*** -0.524%*** -0.383%*** -0.414%*** 
[0, +5] -0.536%*** -0.586%*** -0.425%*** -0.466%*** 
[0, +10] -0.538%*** -0.596%*** -0.378%** -0.421%** 
[+1, +2] -0.254%*** -0.279%*** -0.221%*** -0.239%*** 
[+1, +3] -0.304%*** -0.333%*** -0.224%** -0.245%** 
[+1, +5] -0.348%** -0.395%** -0.266%* -0.298%* 
[+1, +10] -0.350%* -0.405%** -0.219% -0.252% 
[+2, +3] -0.011% -0.087% -0.027% -0.034% 
[+2, +4] 0.039% -0.124% -0.050% -0.053% 
[+2, +5] 0.047% -0.149% -0.069% -0.087% 
[+2, +10] 0.071% -0.159% -0.022% -0.041% 
[+3, +5] -0.022% -0.116% -0.045% -0.059% 
[+3, +10] 0.003% -0.126% 0.003% -0.014% 
[+5, +10] 0.033% -0.035% 0.028% 0.011% 
                                                             Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 5: Additional analysis - Removing adjacent terrorism events 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around 11 (out of 28) 
terrorist attacks listed in Table 1. These are the attacks with reference numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 
10, 12, 14, 15 and 22. ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use the 11 terrorist 
attacks and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive 
Surprise, we use the 11 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with TRMI data 
(all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise 
equals unity if the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day one post-event is negative; set 
to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise equals unity when the CAS on day one post-event is non-
negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on day one post-event is the sum of the Abnormal 
Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting the average raw sentiment of 
trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the event. T-stats and P-values are based 
on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.039% -0.048% 0.121% 
[-5, -1] -0.059% -0.129% 0.008% 
[-3, -1] 0.123% 0.002% 0.238% 
[-2, -1] 0.072% 0.001% 0.139% 
[0, +1] -0.481%*** -0.550%*** -0.417%** 
[0, +2] -0.436%*** -0.516%*** -0.360%** 
[0, +3] -0.499%** -0.601%** -0.402%* 
[0, +5] -0.631%** -0.653%** -0.610%* 
[0, +10] -0.786%** -0.788%* -0.784%* 
[+1, +2] -0.297%** -0.321%** -0.274%* 
[+1, +3] -0.360%* -0.407%* -0.316% 
[+1, +5] -0.492%* -0.458% -0.524%* 
[+1, +10] -0.647%* -0.593% -0.699%* 
[+2, +3] -0.018% -0.052% 0.015% 
[+2, +4] -0.102% -0.106% -0.099% 
[+2, +5] -0.149% -0.103% -0.193% 
[+2, +10] -0.305% -0.238% -0.368% 
[+3, +5] -0.195% -0.137% -0.250% 
[+3, +10] -0.350% -0.272% -0.425% 
[+5, +10] -0.202% -0.133% -0.268% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 6: Additional analysis - Replicating Brounen and Derwall (2010) 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist 
attacks in Brounen and Derwall (2010). ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we 
use 31 terrorist attacks, over the years 1991-2005, and equity data from all the 66 countries in 
Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise we use a subset of 22, post-1998, terrorist 
attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative Abnormal 
Sentiment (CAS) on day one post-event is negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise equals 
unity when the CAS on day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on day 
one post-event is the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by 
subtracting the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to 
the event. T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.104% -0.118% 0.405% 
[-5, -1] -0.024% -0.272% 0.353% 
[-3, -1] 0.059% -0.173% 0.472% 
[-2, -1] 0.027% -0.161% 0.272% 
[0, +1] -0.259%** -0.524%*** -0.035% 
[0, +2] -0.278%** -0.501%** 0.072% 
[0, +3] -0.411%** -0.675%** -0.103% 
[0, +5] -0.403%** -0.652%** -0.174% 
[0, +10] -0.497%* -0.791%* -0.309% 
[+1, +2] -0.170% -0.303% 0.028% 
[+1, +3] -0.304%** -0.477%** -0.147% 
[+1, +5] -0.295%* -0.453% -0.217% 
[+1, +10] -0.390% -0.592% -0.353% 
[+2, +3] -0.152% -0.151% -0.068% 
[+2, +4] -0.127% -0.171% -0.040% 
[+2, +5] -0.144% -0.128% -0.139% 
[+2, +10] -0.238% -0.267% -0.274% 
[+3, +5] -0.125% -0.151% -0.246% 
[+3, +10] -0.219% -0.290% -0.381% 
[+5, +10] -0.111% -0.096% -0.234% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 7: Additional analysis - Replicating Chesney et al. (2011) 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist 
attacks in Chesney et al. (2011). ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use 77 
terrorist attacks, over the years 1994-2005, and equity data from all the 66 countries in Table 2. 
In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise we use a subset of 62, post-1998, terrorist attacks 
and equity data from the 63 countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative 
Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day one post-event is negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive 
Surprise equals unity when the CAS on day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero 
otherwise. The CAS on day one post-event is the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 
0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from 
the raw sentiment relative to the event. T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen 
(2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.138% 0.080% 0.036% 
[-5, -1] 0.245%** 0.042% 0.356% 
[-3, -1] 0.211%** 0.084% 0.297%* 
[-2, -1] 0.130%* 0.038% 0.212%* 
[0, +1] -0.014% -0.197%*** 0.135% 
[0, +2] 0.017% -0.195%** 0.174% 
[0, +3] -0.028% -0.261%*** 0.107% 
[0, +5] -0.073% -0.290%** 0.068% 
[0, +10] 0.078% -0.240% 0.265% 
[+1, +2] 0.037% -0.035% 0.086% 
[+1, +3] -0.008% -0.101%* 0.019% 
[+1, +5] -0.053% -0.131% -0.020% 
[+1, +10] 0.098% -0.080% 0.177% 
[+2, +3] -0.014% -0.064% -0.027% 
[+2, +4] -0.014% -0.060% -0.078% 
[+2, +5] -0.059% -0.093% -0.067% 
[+2, +10] 0.092% -0.043% 0.131% 
[+3, +5] -0.090% -0.095% -0.106% 
[+3, +10] 0.061% -0.045% 0.092% 
[+5, +10] 0.106% 0.018% 0.209% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 8: Additional analysis - Accounting for size, value and momentum 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist 
attacks listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). The abnormal return (AR) is based on 
the global version of Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, which includes, in addition to the three-
factor Fama-French model, the global momentum return. Everything else remains the same. In 
the Overall case, we use all 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. 
In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise, we use all the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data 
from the 63 countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia 
and Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on 
day one post-event is negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise equals unity when the 
CAS on day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on day one post-
event is the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting 
the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the event. 
T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.186% -0.105% -0.268%* 
[-5, -1] -0.045% -0.112% 0.023% 
[-3, -1] 0.013% -0.113% 0.140% 
[-2, -1] -0.055% -0.150% 0.041% 
[0, +1] -0.330%*** -0.432%*** -0.227%** 
[0, +2] -0.262%** -0.391%*** -0.132% 
[0, +3] -0.341%** -0.487%*** -0.194% 
[0, +5] -0.284% -0.371%** -0.195% 
[0, +10] -0.259% -0.315% -0.202% 
[+1, +2] -0.142%* -0.184%** -0.099% 
[+1, +3] -0.220%* -0.279%** -0.161% 
[+1, +5] -0.163% -0.164% -0.163% 
[+1, +10] -0.139% -0.108% -0.169% 
[+2, +3] -0.011% -0.055% 0.034% 
[+2, +4] 0.039% -0.010% 0.088% 
[+2, +5] 0.047% 0.061% 0.032% 
[+2, +10] 0.071% 0.117% 0.025% 
[+3, +5] -0.022% 0.020% -0.063% 
[+3, +10] 0.003% 0.076% -0.070% 
[+5, +10] 0.033% 0.127% -0.062% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 9: Additional Analysis - Accounting for the Beta instability 
This table presents Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks 
listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). The abnormal return (AR) is estimated by setting 
to unity the coefficient beta in the Equation (2). Everything else remains the same. In the Overall 
case, we use all 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases 
of Negative and Positive Surprise, we use all the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 
countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day 
one post-event is negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise equals unity when the CAS on 
day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on day one post- event is the 
sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting the average 
raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the event. T-stats and P-
values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.102% 0.130% 0.074% 
[-5, -1] 0.128% 0.034% 0.222% 
[-3, -1] 0.154% 0.037% 0.272% 
[-2, -1] 0.098% 0.002% 0.193% 
[0, +1] -0.388%*** -0.473%*** -0.302%*** 
[0, +2] -0.504%*** -0.619%*** -0.389%*** 
[0, +3] -0.554%*** -0.660%*** -0.447%*** 
[0, +5] -0.587%*** -0.608%*** -0.565%*** 
[0, +10] -0.602%*** -0.639%*** -0.564%*** 
[+1, +2] -0.357%*** -0.398%*** -0.316%*** 
[+1, +3] -0.407%*** -0.439%*** -0.374%*** 
[+1, +5] -0.440%*** -0.388%** -0.492%*** 
[+1, +10] -0.455%** -0.419%** -0.491%** 
[+2, +3] -0.166%* -0.187% -0.145% 
[+2, +4] -0.183% -0.191% -0.174% 
[+2, +5] -0.199% -0.136% -0.263% 
[+2, +10] -0.214% -0.166% -0.262% 
[+3, +5] -0.083% 0.010% -0.176% 
[+3, +10] -0.098% -0.020% -0.176% 
[+5, +10] -0.032% 0.025% -0.088% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 10: Additional analysis – Switching regimes 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist 
attacks listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use all 28 
terrorist attacks and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and 
Positive Surprise, we use all the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with 
TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative 
Surprise equals unity if the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day one post-event is 
negative; set to zero otherwise. Positive Surprise equals unity when the CAS on day one post-
event is non-negative; set to zero otherwise. The CAS on day one post-event is the sum of the 
Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting the average raw 
sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the event. T-stats and P-
values are based on the methodology in Aktas et al. (2007). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.159% -0.057% -0.263%** 
[-5, -1] 0.013% -0.094% 0.121% 
[-3, -1] 0.076% -0.031% 0.183% 
[-2, -1] 0.005% -0.068% 0.078% 
[0, +1] -0.378%*** -0.398%*** -0.359%*** 
[0, +2] -0.327%** -0.353%** -0.300%*** 
[0, +3] -0.378%* -0.391%* -0.365%* 
[0, +5] -0.457%* -0.388%* -0.527%* 
[0, +10] -0.628%* -0.567% -0.689%** 
[+1, +2] -0.151%*** -0.137%** -0.165%** 
[+1, +3] -0.203% -0.175% -0.230% 
[+1, +5] -0.282%* -0.172% -0.392% 
[+1, +10] -0.452%* -0.351% -0.553%** 
[+2, +3] 0.000% 0.007% -0.007% 
[+2, +4] -0.055% -0.072% -0.038% 
[+2, +5] -0.079% 0.010% -0.168% 
[+2, +10] -0.250% -0.169% -0.330% 
[+3, +5] -0.131% -0.035% -0.227% 
[+3, +10] -0.301% -0.214% -0.389% 
[+5, +10] -0.194%* -0.097% -0.292% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 11: Additional analysis – An alternative measure for Surprise 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks 
listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use all 28 terrorist attacks 
and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise#2, 
we use all the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with TRMI data (all countries 
in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise#2 equals unity if the 
Cumulative Difference in Sentiment (CDS) on day one post-event is negative, set to zero otherwise. 
Positive Surprise#2 equals unity when the CDS on day one post-event is non-negative; set to zero 
otherwise. The CDS on day one post-event is the sum of the Difference in Sentiment (DS) on days 
0 and 1. DS is the difference of the raw Sentiment (S) of two consecutive days (i.e. DSt = St – St-1). 
T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise#2 Positive Surprise#2 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.011% 0.004% -0.027% 
[-5, -1] 0.043% 0.201% -0.115% 
[-3, -1] 0.086% 0.168% 0.003% 
[-2, -1] 0.033% 0.111% -0.044% 
[0, +1] -0.414%*** -0.534%*** -0.294%*** 
[0, +2] -0.442%*** -0.518%*** -0.365%*** 
[0, +3] -0.491%*** -0.568%*** -0.415%*** 
[0, +5] -0.536%*** -0.616%*** -0.456%*** 
[0, +10] -0.538%*** -0.694%*** -0.382%** 
[+1, +2] -0.254%*** -0.255%*** -0.253%*** 
[+1, +3] -0.304%*** -0.305%** -0.302%*** 
[+1, +5] -0.348%** -0.352%** -0.344%** 
[+1, +10] -0.350%* -0.431%* -0.270% 
[+2, +3] -0.011% -0.034% -0.121% 
[+2, +4] 0.039% -0.132% -0.087% 
[+2, +5] 0.047% -0.081% -0.162% 
[+2, +10] 0.071% -0.160% -0.088% 
[+3, +5] -0.022% -0.098% -0.091% 
[+3, +10] 0.003% -0.176% -0.017% 
[+5, +10] 0.033% -0.028% -0.002% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 12: Additional analysis - Accounting for human loss 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist 
attacks listed in Table 1. ACAR is given in Equation (4). In the Overall case, we use all 28 terrorist 
attacks and equity data from all 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive 
Residual Surprise we use all the 28 terrorist attacks and equity data from the 63 countries with 
TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative 
Residual Surprise equals unity if the Residual Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) is negative; 
set to zero otherwise. Positive Residual Surprise equals unity when the Residual CAS is non-
negative; set to zero otherwise. The Residual CAS is the CAS less the expected CAS. The expected 
(or fitted) CAS is estimated following the regression of CAS on the natural logarithm of the 
number of fatalities reported with the terrorist attacks. Finally the CAS is the sum of the Abnormal 
Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1, relative to the event. AS is estimated by subtracting the average 
raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2 from the raw sentiment relative to the event. T-stats and P-
values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall 
Negative Residual 
Surprise 
Positive Residual 
Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] -0.011% -0.039% 0.022% 
[-5, -1] 0.043% -0.066% 0.173% 
[-3, -1] 0.086% -0.042% 0.238% 
[-2, -1] 0.033% -0.042% 0.122% 
[0, +1] -0.414%*** -0.512%*** -0.296%*** 
[0, +2] -0.442%*** -0.526%*** -0.341%*** 
[0, +3] -0.491%*** -0.567%*** -0.400%*** 
[0, +5] -0.536%*** -0.500%*** -0.579%*** 
[0, +10] -0.538%*** -0.553%** -0.520%** 
[+1, +2] -0.254%*** -0.274%*** -0.229%*** 
[+1, +3] -0.304%*** -0.316%** -0.289%*** 
[+1, +5] -0.348%** -0.248% -0.467%** 
[+1, +10] -0.350%* -0.302% -0.408%** 
[+2, +3] -0.011% -0.055% -0.104% 
[+2, +4] 0.039% -0.063% -0.165% 
[+2, +5] 0.047% 0.013% -0.283% 
[+2, +10] 0.071% -0.041% -0.224% 
[+3, +5] -0.022% 0.026% -0.238% 
[+3, +10] 0.003% -0.027% -0.179% 
[+5, +10] 0.033% 0.022% -0.059% 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 13: Additional analysis - OLS regression 
This table presents results from OLS regression analysis with the post-event 
Abnormal Return (AR) as the dependent variable and the post-event Abnormal 
Sentiment (AS), or Difference in Sentiment (DS), as the independent variable. ARt 
is given in Equation (2). ASt is estimated by subtracting from the raw sentiment of 
trading day t, relative to the event, the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to 
-2. DSt is the difference of the raw Sentiment (S) in two consecutive days (i.e. DSt 
= St – St-1). The subscript “t” denotes the relative to the event trading day and ranges 
from zero (0) to ten (10) in this occasion. We control for event and country-specific 
characteristics with indicator variables and for the heteroscedasticity of the error 
terms with White-Huber (heteroscedasticity robust) standard errors. 
Panel A. Abnormal Return and Abnormal Sentiment 
 ARt ARt ARt 
ASt 0.0108
*** 0.0108*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00109) (0.00116) 
Volatilityt  -0.138 -0.140 
  (0.365) (0.367) 
Liquidityt   0.0000750 
   (0.000119) 
Constant -0.00255 -0.00246* -0.00277* 
 (0.00156) (0.00148) (0.00160) 
Observations 19765 19765 18895 
Adj. R-Square 0.0115 0.0116 0.0125 
Ind. Variables Country & Event Country & Event Country & Event 
Panel B. Abnormal Return and Difference in Sentiment 
 ARt ARt ARt 
DSt 0.00712
*** 0.00713*** 0.00749*** 
 (0.000875) (0.000875) (0.000919) 
Volatilityt  -0.141 -0.144 
  (0.364) (0.366) 
Liquidityt   0.0000691 
   (0.000119) 
Constant -0.00249 -0.00240 -0.00264* 
 (0.00156) (0.00148) (0.00160) 
Observations 19746 19746 18876 
Adj. R-Square 0.00951 0.00960 0.0103 
Ind. Variables Country & Event Country & Event Country & Event 
Notes: * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
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Figure 1: Average CAR (ACAR) vs Relative Date 
This figure plots Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks in Table 1 using equity data from countries 
in Table 2. ACAR is given in Equation (4). For the Overall case, we consider all the 28 attacks in Table 1 across 66 stock market indices 
from countries in Table 2. For the Surprise cases, we consider all the 28 attacks in Table 1 across the 63 countries with TRMI data (all 
countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). A plot of 28 randomly selected dates (to match the number and time 
span of the terrorist attacks in Table 1) across all 66 countries (in Table 2) is included for comparison purposes. 
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Figure 2: Average CAR (ACAR) vs relative date 
This figure extends the post-event period in Figure 1. It plots Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) around the terrorist attacks in Table 
1 using equity data from countries in Table 2. ACAR is given in Equation (4). For the Overall case, we consider all the 28 attacks in Table 1 across 
66 stock market indices from countries in Table 2. For the Surprise cases, we consider all the 28 attacks in Table 1 across the 63 countries with 
TRMI data (all countries in Table 2, excluding Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). A plot of 28 randomly selected dates (to match the number 
and time span of the terrorist attacks in Table 1) across all 66 countries (in Table 2) is included for comparison purposes. 
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